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In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed a complex and
sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to a sudden, persistent, and
damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted until 2002, when President George W.
Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel
products. This case of the steel industry’s trade policy campaign provides an opportunity to
examine selected models of protection-seeking industries and lobbying to ask why and how the
steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental response. These questions are explored
though a descriptive case of the steel industry’s protection-seeking campaign followed by a
comparative examination of previous models of protection-seeking firms, and lobbying to achieve
protectionist policies. A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protection-
seeking and factors affecting lobbying strategies show that most, almost all, were present in the
steel case. In fact, a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary understanding of
lobbying is suggested in a complex policy environment. Such an environment can be characterized
by: the need to influence multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, executive; the
desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity – laws or resolutions,
administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between different levels and branches of
government; employment of coordinated interrelated lobbying techniques; and simultaneity of
these factors.
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Meta-Strategic Lobbying: The 1998 Steel Trade Policy Case
     In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed 
a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to 
a sudden, persistent and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted 
until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade 
laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. The campaign began 
with the formation of a union-company coalition. It included the filing of trade 
cases and a major lobbying effort to get additional Congressional and White 
House support. This case of the steel industry’s trade policy campaign provides an 
opportunity to examine selected models of protection-seeking and lobbying to ask 
why and how the steel coalition achieved this extraordinary governmental 
response. These questions are explored though a descriptive case of the steel 
industry’s protection-seeking campaign followed by a comparative examination 
of selected models of protection-seeking and trade policy lobbying.  A meta-
strategic model of lobbying is suggested.
Background
  For more than a quarter of a century, the steel industry in the United States 
has sought government intervention in the marketplace to counteract periodic 
import surges of cheaper steel from foreign competitors. The industry has long 
argued that the global steel marketplace is imperfect, characterized by subsidies, 
cartels, protected markets, and mercantilist national economic policies.1 The 
industry has effectively used the power of government to limit access to the U.S. 
market by foreign producers and thus protect itself from wide variations in prices 
and earnings and also to gain reprieve from otherwise painful restructuring and 
downsizing.2 From 1969 until 1992 steel enjoyed industry-specific protection in 
the form of voluntary restraint agreements (1969-74), a reference price system for 
antidumping cases (1977-82), and two more rounds of voluntary restraint 
agreements (1984-92). This history is consistent with the model of protectionism 
developed by Vinod K. Aggarwal, Robert O. Keohane, and David B. Yoffie3
identifying three patterns of protectionism: institutionalized, temporary, and 
sporadic. Steel protection is classified as sporadic. As the effects of specific 
protection measures provide benefits to steel firms, the protections are relaxed, 
only to be followed later by others as import-related economic distress returns.  
1
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       Industry-specific protection gradually ended under President George Herbert 
Walker Bush’s “Steel Liberalization Program” so that, by 1992, the steel industry 
had only the nation’s general trade laws from which to seek any further 
protection. This era of trade law remedies began in 1992 when the integrated4
steel companies filed a massive set of antidumping and countervailing duty cases 
on which it ultimately won a mixed verdict.5
       The trade policy successes of the steel industry have been attributed to the 
power of the so-called “steel triangle” of steel mills, the steelworkers union, and 
powerful lawmakers representing steel-making constituencies. As the nation’s 
economy has changed and the industry has restructured into smaller more 
dispersed firms, a lessening of the industry’s political effectiveness was 
predicted.6 But in 1998, the steel triangle still had some life left in it. Though a 
smaller industry, steel mills were still a major economic presence in politically 
important states. The steelworkers union remained politically active, able to
generate visible political participation by its members. The union and the 
companies maintained permanent government affairs offices in Washington, 
where their lobbyists kept in regular contact with constituent Members of 
Congress and with key leaders in the Congress and the Executive Branch. The 
Congressional Steel Caucuses, comprised of Senators and Representatives from 
steel-making states and districts had over one hundred members. They were 
efficiently staffed to coordinate their work and could be called upon to hold 
hearings, draft resolutions, circulate letters, and support legislation. Some 
members held influential positions on key committees such as the House Ways 
and Means Trade Subcommittee, the House Appropriations Committee, and the 
Senate Finance Committee. When the sudden import surges of 1998 arrived, the 
industry was positioned for action because it had remained engaged in trade 
policy, even during the relatively quiet periods.
1998-2002 Steel Trade Policy Case
       In 1998, the steel industry was again in an import crisis, caused largely by an 
economic meltdown in Asia and privatization in the former Soviet Union. A 
sudden flood of low-priced imported steel staggered the U.S. industry.  Between 
June 1997 and June 1998, total steel imports increased from 2.6 million tons to 
3.6 million tons. Imports from Japan increased 113.7 percent, imports from Korea 
4
 “Integrated” steel companies are those older large vertically integrated firms that make steel from 
iron ore using blast furnaces.  Newer “minimills” make steel in electric arc furnaces using scrap 
steel as the primary feedstock.
5
 See Brook (1998), (2003); Hogan (1994).
6
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increased 89.5 percent, and imports from Russia went up 50.6 percent.7 The speed 
and volume of this wave of imports drove the major integrated steel companies 
and the steelworkers union into a new lobbying coalition to pool their collective 
political influence to protect the industry.
Organization and Collective Action
       In the spring of 1998, George Becker, President of the United Steelworkers of 
America (USWA) convened a meeting with the Chief Executive Officers of U.S. 
Steel (USX Corporation), Bethlehem Steel, and LTV Steel (LTV Corporation), 
the three largest integrated steel companies in the United States.  Each operated 
under a similar labor agreement with the USWA. Becker warned of the impact of 
the current import surges and proposed a joint lobbying effort to seek government 
protection for the industry. The coalition would be funded by the “nickel fund” --
a notional account held by each company in accordance with their labor 
agreements amounting to five cents for each ton of steel produced. It was 
estimated that as much as $10 million or more might have been accumulated in 
these funds. Nickel fund money was intended to be spent jointly by the companies 
and the union to further the interests of the industry. The CEOs agreed and the 
“Stand Up For Steel” Coalition (SUFS) was born.
       The possibility of involving other companies was discussed, but initially 
rejected. “Free riders” on trade matters had always been an issue in the industry, 
but the three largest companies were willing to bear the cost, as they also did in 
most trade law cases, expecting also to reap the most benefit and wanting to 
exercise control over the campaign. Later, other companies with nickel funds, 
such as National Steel, Inland Steel, and Cleveland Cliffs were included in the 
coalition but they played relatively minor roles.
       The Washington government affairs offices of the union and the three 
companies were charged with developing a strategy for the coalition and 
executing the lobbying campaign. A law firm was retained to provide staff 
support, along with public relations firms to develop and implement 
communications plans, and two major law firms that traditionally handled trade 
law cases for the industry.
Policy Goals
        The policy goals of the coalition were deliberately vague. There were 
multiple options from which to choose, including filing antidumping cases, 
seeking new protections from the Congress, asking for new international 
negotiations, or invoking the trade law powers of the President. Each could help 
ease the crisis and they were not mutually exclusive. While each might require a 
7
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different set of tactics, many were mutually reinforcing and could be employed 
simultaneously.  Essentially, the decision was made to pursue a complex strategy 
that left all options open and leveraged the political opportunities that a 
Congressional election year presented. This strategy was much as J. M. Finger 
and T. Murray had observed in an earlier period: to overload the system to 
achieve relief from imports.8
       As outlined in a SUFS strategy document, the coalition set out on “an 
intensive public relations/government relations campaign to educate and influence 
the Clinton Administration to take action.” This was to be accomplished by 
“building broad public and congressional support for a meaningful U. S. 
government response” to the recent surge in imports by using use all means 
necessary and available to it. While the industry indicated that it would continue 
to seek enforcement of the trade laws and to file additional trade cases, it argued 
that the extraordinary nature of this import crisis required an extraordinary 
response. Listed among the possible options were “announcement and 
implementation of steel import monitoring and/or permitting programs, strengthen 
enforcement of unfair trade laws, bi-lateral diplomatic initiatives, negotiating 
informal export restraints, and self initiation of (trade law) actions.” Placing the 
burden on the Administration to define the policy choices, the SUFS strategy 
called for the government to “deal forcefully with the problem, using whatever 
tools it has as needed….”9 The early pattern for such an approach was identified 
by Moore in the 1984 VRA campaign as “…brilliant use of the multiple paths to 
protection in the United States.”10
       This strategy rested on an understanding of the complex nature of the trade 
policy structure within the U.S. government. Administration trade policy can 
involve the President; the National Economic Council; the Secretaries of 
Commerce, Labor, and Treasury; the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR); and 
Congress. Trade law administration involves the International Trade 
Administration (ITA) in the Department of Commerce and the independent U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC).  In addition, these actors can influence 
each other. For instance, Congress can influence the Administration through 
appropriations and authorizations, while the President can influence the ITA and 
ITC through appointments.
       This complex interweaving of policy actors, lobbying strategies, and 
influence flows is depicted in Figure 1. The diagram shows the initiators of the 
campaign, the steel companies and the union, and their respective employment of 
actors in the lobbying effort. The union mobilized its members; the companies 
mobilized their non-union employees and activated retained lawyers and 
8
 Finger and Murray (1990): 48.
9
 “Steel Industry/Union Trade Program” dated July 28, 1998.
10
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consultants. Both also lobbied Congress and the Administration directly. The 
Congressional Steel Caucuses were active in influencing their colleagues on 
Capitol Hill as well as pressing the trade policy agencies of the executive branch 
and making steel’s case to the White House. Information and influence flows 
back and forth among the White House, the Congress, the Department of 
Commerce, USTR and the ITC.  Each actor is subjected to multiple “hits” as the 
actions of one another impact each other. With multiple possible outcomes, no 
one governmental entity is a single target. Instead, they are all both targets from 
whom policy outcomes are sought, and intermediaries whose influence is sought 
with and by other governmental actors.    




      Print and broadcast ads were placed in media markets where there were large 
concentrations of steel mills and steelworkers, as well as in the Washington, DC, 
area. The advertisements were intended to inform the public, define the terms of 
the debate for public officials, and rally the steelworkers and their communities. 
The first ads were informative, stating that “foreign steel is being dumped at 
cutthroat prices,” and “foreign dumping is threatening the jobs of hardworking 
5
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men and women.” The ads also argued that the union and management have 
worked together to create a new steel industry that is “clean, efficient, high tech 
and innovative” but now “we’re fighting to keep it strong, but we can’t do it 
alone.” A second set of advertisements targeted the President, calling on him to 
“stop the unfair dumping.” An ad that ran on the day President Clinton met with 
Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi said, “We understand the Prime Minister wants 
to save his country’s jobs. Mr. President, don’t let him do it by taking ours.” 
Another, placed after passage of a Congressional resolution, said, “Congress has 
left no doubt on the need for you to put an immediate stop to the crisis the steel 
industry is facing.” One ad featured an open letter to the President signed by 
USWA President Becker, Bethlehem Steel CEO Curtis H. Barnette, LTV Steel 
CEO Peter Kelly, USX CEO Thomas Usher and fifteen additional chief 
executives of smaller steel and steel-related companies. It cited the modernization 
of the U.S. steel industry, called for a “level playing field,” and said, “With your 
help vital American jobs and the American steel success story can continue.”  
Often this “paid” media was supplemented by so-called “earned” media -- local 
news coverage of steelworker rallies, statements by elected officials, 
governmental actions, and human-interest stories. The coalition also encouraged 
op-ed articles and letters to the editor from steel executives, workers, and 
independent experts.
Constituency-Building
       While the advertising campaign was bringing the steel campaign into 
prominent view, the USWA worked at building constituency-based pressure on 
elected officials. By the end of the year, nearly thirty rallies had been held in 
Washington and in targeted states and congressional districts around the country. 
They featured union and management speakers, local politicians and candidates, 
and hundreds of active and retired steelworkers. The union field staff organized 
most of these events. They generated additional news coverage, letter-writing 
campaigns, and statements of support from elected officials. The rallies were 
especially timed for October to coincide with the peak period of the election 
campaigns. Leveraging the election year advantage, candidates (and other 
community leaders) were urged to sign a pledge that SUFS had devised. It read, 
“We pledge to support and take any and all actions necessary to immediately stop 
this flood of unfairly traded foreign steel imports.”
Campaign Contributions
        As they did every year, the companies and the union also made political 
contributions through political action committees (PACs). Well over one million 
dollars was spent in 1998 with the bulk of it going to incumbents in steel states 
and districts and holders of key congressional leadership positions. Most of it 
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came from the USWA, whose PAC dwarfed the combined size of the company 
political action committees.11
Lobbying Congress
       On September 10 the Congressional Steel Caucus held a “hearing” where the 
threat to the industry was presented in testimony by the steel company CEOs and 
union leaders. Letters from Steel Caucus members were sent to the White House 
urging prompt action. Legislation and resolutions were introduced as various 
Members sought to exploit the politics of the steel trade issue. Making use of 
parliamentary tactics, steel supporters in the House tied up the last week of the 
Congressional session with matters relating to steel trade, effectively dominating 
the policy agenda as Congress worked toward adjournment in an election year. 
On October 15th a “Sense of the House” Resolution was passed by a 345 to 44 
vote calling on the Executive Branch to conduct a review and investigate steel 
imports from ten specified countries, impose a one-year ban on steel imports from 
these countries if they are found to be violating the “spirit and letter” of trade 
agreements, set up a task force for monitoring steel imports, and submit a report 
to Congress in January, 1999. In the words of one steel state Congressman, “The 
House has made it clear that it wants the Administration to act swiftly and 
decisively on behalf of American workers.”12
Trade Cases
       On September 30, a set of antidumping cases was filed against imports from 
Russia, Japan and Brazil and countervailing duty cases against imports from 
Brazil, thus setting in motion the formal investigatory and review processes 
within the ITA and the ITC. After a meeting between the Executive Committee of 
the Congressional Steel Caucus and Secretary of Commerce William Daley, 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and USTR Charlene Barshevsky, the 
Department of Commerce announced accelerated action on the petitions. The 
Department would conduct a 120-day review of the petitions (usually such 
reviews take 160 days) and retroactively impose preliminary duties in cases where 
dumping was found.  Additionally, USTR announced its intention to initiate talks 
with Japan, South Korea and the EU (concerning their quantitative restrictions on 
Russian steel imports).  The President’s Economic Advisor, Gene Sperling said, 
“We are persuaded there is a compelling case” for antidumping petitions.13 These 
11
 Source: Federal Election Commission, various reports.
12
 Press Release from Office of Congressman Jim Traficant, “House Overwhelmingly Okays 
Traficant Bill Calling on President to Ban Steel Imports,” October 15, 1998.
13
 Press Release from Office of Congressman Jim Oberstar, “Steel Dumping Cases To Get 
Accelerated Action,” October 9, 1998.
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actions were expected to have a chilling effect on steel imports while the ITC 
considered the cases in the midst of this politically charged atmosphere.14
Lobbying the Executive Branch
       SUFS also targeted the Administration for a direct lobbying effort, supported 
by the pressure from Capitol Hill.  Becker and the three CEOs met with 
Secretaries Daley and Rubin and USTR Barshevsky. They returned to 
Washington twice more for Cabinet-level meetings at the White House with 
Daley, Rubin, Barshevsky, Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman, White House 
Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles and Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta. The 
meetings were generally polite but the Administration was non-committal.  
       Frustrated by this response from the Administration, House and Senate Steel 
Caucus leaders asked for a meeting with President Clinton and on November 5, 
the CEOs and Becker met with the President. The response was the same. The 
President felt their pain, but ordered no new actions.  
       As 1998 closed, perhaps the tangible results of the SUFS effort seemed 
negligible. Thirty-five American steel companies would file for bankruptcy 
protection between 1997 and 2002.15 But, the steel import issue had dominated 
the domestic political and policy agenda in 1998. In organizing an effective 
coalition, mobilizing grass-roots and Congressional support, and committing 
resources to the fight, the base was built for a continuing campaign that lasted into 
2002. Over this period, most of the 1998 trade cases would be won at the ITC. 
The “sunset” reviews of the 1992 cases would also be mostly won at the ITC. 
More companies joined the protection-seeking effort, including Nucor, the largest 
minimill. The SUFS coalition continued its advertising, constituency-building and 
lobbying campaigns through the 2000 elections. With the election of a new 
President, arguably with the help of votes from steel states like West Virginia, a 
renewed effort to influence the Administration was undertaken. This 
Administration reacted differently.  Throughout 2001, in meetings with steel 
CEOs, the new Secretaries of Commerce and Treasury and a new USTR pushed 
for restructuring of the industry as a condition for special protection. The new 
Administration was also confronted with the prospect that a steel-sympathetic 
Congress would reject legislation extending the trade negotiating authority that it 
needed in order to pursue free trade agreements.  Faced with this threat to his 
economic policy agenda, in March 2002 President Bush invoked Section 201 and 
placed tariffs on steel imports.
       The Section 201 tariffs were scheduled to last three years, gradually declining 
over the period. Predictably, the President’s decision was praised by the steel 
industry and the steelworkers’ union, and criticized by steel consuming industries. 
14
 See Brook (2003): 92.
15
 Stand Up For Steel (2003): 9.
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Steel prices increased and stabilized and steel companies started to return to some 
level of profitability.  
       But protests against the tariffs came swiftly.  Steel-exporting countries 
challenged the action in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In late 2003, the 
WTO ruled against the U.S. and retaliatory tariffs were being announced by 
European trading partners. Complaints of high steel prices and shortages by steel 
consumers, including the large automobile and heavy equipment manufacturers 
began to gain support in politically important states like Michigan. Moreover, 
changes in the international marketplace, driven largely by rapid increases in steel 
demand by China, eased the global pressure on U.S. steel prices. The policy 
objectives of the Administration also seemed to be taking hold. Evidence of 
industry restructuring and capacity reduction that Administration officials had 
sought began to appear as the new International Steel Group (ISG) consolidated 
the assets of bankrupt LTV Steel, Acme Steel and Bethlehem Steel; United States 
Steel acquired National Steel; and Nucor consolidated the minimill sector with 
acquisition of Auburn Steel, Trico Steel, and Birmingham Steel. The USWA 
negotiated new labor agreements with ISG and U.S. Steel that reduced labor costs 
and changed work rules.   In December 2003, faced with both serious challenges 
and credible claims of policy success, the President rescinded the steel tariffs 
early.
Models of Protection-Seeking, Policy Choices and Lobbying
       Firms engage in non-market strategies to affect economic rents and subsidies 
when the government, rather than the market, controls the greater opportunities.16
How does the steel protection case illustrate models of the determinants of 
protection-seeking firms, trade policy choices, and lobbying? Some common 
themes focusing on economic, structural, and political characteristics have 
emerged that can be examined in the context of this case. 
Models of Protection-Seeking Firms and Industries
       Models of protection-seeking examine firms and industries to identify 
common characteristics. The model developed by Aggarwal, Keohane and 
Yoffie17 suggests that the barriers to entry, the barriers to exit, and the size of the 
domestic industry determine the dynamics of protectionism. Steel protection is 
classified as sporadic, with high barriers to entry and exit and a relatively large 
size.  Aggarwal, et. al. were unsure about the future of steel protection. On the 
one hand, observing a lowering of the barriers to entry (demonstrated by the 
appearance of minimills, and the emergence of diversification strategies by steel 
16
 Baron (1996): 30.
17
 Aggarwal, et. al. (1987).
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firms), the possibility of reduced demand for protection, and lessened 
effectiveness in expanding protection was envisioned. On the other hand, if 
diversification efforts failed, institutionalized protection could result. Presciently, 
they concluded, “The industry has the resources and the organizational strength to 
demand a high level of protection. Because the industry continues to be in distress 
and foreign countries subsidize their steel exports, the U. S. government is likely 
to regard protection as legitimate on the grounds of fair trade.”18 Indeed, political 
sympathies for affected constituencies can lead policy makers to invoke social 
justice considerations in granting temporary protection in these types of 
circumstances.19
       In cataloguing the cross-industry determinants of protection from a previous 
studies, Dani Rodrik identifies three sets of conditions: (1) labor intensive, low 
skill, low wage; (2) high import penetration, an increase in import penetration, 
and an industry in decline; and (3) regionally concentrated industry, with 
customers that are not highly concentrated.20 Douglas A. Schuler’s21 examination 
of the steel industry’s trade policy strategies considers issues of size, related 
business diversification, presence of dedicated organizational political units,
availability of slack resources, levels of import penetration, and levels of domestic 
demand. He found that the largest firms were the most politically active; types of 
political activities changed over time; and external economic circumstances 
affected the timing of political strategies. With significant positive correlations for 
size, Shuler affirms collective action theory that argues that the largest firms are 
willing to take action, and tolerate free riders, because the largest firms stand to 
gain the largest share of the benefits.22 As shown in Table I, most of the 
characteristics described above are present in this case. Some were in transition as 
the structure of the industry was changing, and only the domestic demand and low 
wage elements appear not to be present.
18
 Aggarwal, et. al. (1987): 361.
19
 Hillman  (1982).
20




 See Olson  (1965).
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Protection-Seeking Characteristics Present in Steel Case
Characteristic Present In Transition Not 
Present
High Barriers to Entry          X
High Barriers to Exit      X
Large Industry          X
Related Diversification          X
Political Organizational Units      X
Slack Resources      X
Weak Domestic Demand     X
Labor Intensive      X
Low Skill    X
Low Wage     X
High Import Penetration      X
Increase in Import Penetration      X
Declining Industry          X
Regionally Concentrated Industry      X
Customers not Regionally Concentrated      X
Source:  Author’s analysis
Models to Explain Trade Policy Choices
       In searching for explanations for economically suboptimal protectionist trade 
policy choices, Rodrik’s23 survey of the political economy literature on protection 
includes four models for explaining public policy choices in favor of protection. 
The tariff formulation approach links the level of protection to the amount of 
lobbying resources deployed. Tariffs are determined by the amount of labor put 
into lobbying for the tariffs. This approach ignores the preferences of policy 
makers. The political support function approach, however, depicts policy makers 
trading off the gains for a sympathetic industry against the losses for the general 
population. The distributional effects of trade policy supports protection when the
benefits are concentrated and the costs are diffused. The median voter approach 
uses a democracy model to suggest that a policy choice can be treated as 
maximizing the utility of the median voter. That is, individual ideal policy 
preferences can be linearly arrayed and the median point identified where a 
majority will support, or at least accept the median policy outcome. 
       The campaign contributions approach attempts to establish a direct link 
between campaign contributions, election outcomes, and policy choices. A larger 
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such as union endorsements, voter mobilization, independent advertising, etc. to 
establish an alignment between maximizing the interests of the policymaker 
(election) and maximizing the interests of the political ally (policy support). 
Intuitively, such political factors can influence policy choices, but Rodrik finds 
these models insufficient to explain trade policy decisions fully. Instead, Rodrik 
poses a political economy model of trade policy with a “demand side” comprised 
of individual preferences expressed through interest groups, and a “supply side” 
consisting of policymaker preferences expressed through the institutional 
structures of government. The preferences of both individuals and policy makers 
are affected by numerous factors and their means of expressing political demands 
through organizations and institutions is complex. Rodrik concludes that none of 
the current models claims to provide a complete political-economic model and 
many leave implicit some factors that influence preferences and institutions.24
       Eight themes emerge from Anne O. Krueger’s25 examination of various 
sectoral studies: (1) the question of national interest, (2) the role of ideas such as 
appeals to fairness and equity, (3) economic determinants of political strength, (4) 
the role of institutions as constraints, (5) the presumption of “rational” actors, (6) 
importance of industry unanimity, (7) the role of lobbying and organization, and 
(8) a history of past protection. Each of these appears to be present in the steel 
case. The steel industry and its supporters argued that national interests dictated a 
“need” for a healthy steel industry, and they argued for “fairness” in global steel 
trade. The industry derived political strength from the economic dominance it 
held in key states and the distributional effects of protection. Leaders of the 
companies and union also believed that they were acting rationally – that 
protection would benefit the industry. The institutions of government constrained 
the process and extended the case over four years, during which time industry 
unanimity was achieved, including the emergence of minimills as supporters of 
protection. Strong organization and lobbying were present as was the experience 
factor resulting from a history of successfully seeking protection.
Lobbying Models
       Models of lobbying strategies and techniques, generally, are also instructive 
for understanding trade policy choices, since protection-seeking firms and 
industries employ lobbyists and lobbying techniques for the purpose of 
influencing trade policy. Frequently these models address the political action of 
firms in parsimonious one-dimensional linear style, usually focused on the actions 
of legislators, often looking at one aspect of lobbying or political action for an 
explanatory link to legislative behavior. For instance, political action committee 
24
 Rodrik (1995): 1459-1460.
25
 Krueger (1995): 431-441.
12
Business and Politics, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 4
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1094
(PAC) contributions may be compared to voting records,26 or considered as 
investments in relationships with lawmakers.27 Campaign contributions have been 
examined to explain trade policy outcomes as a competition of bidders in a 
welfare-maximization model.28 Constituency interests and constituency building 
may be compared to legislative outcomes.29 Some studies have considered the 
effects of information on policy outcomes,30 while others have looked at 
communications strategies and advocacy advertising.31 Recent studies have 
focused on the operation of corporate public affairs and government affairs staff 
departments and their professional lobbyists.32
   David P. Baron’s instructive model of political strategy formation for a single 
interest group is described below.33
   Institutional Arena          Administration/Regulation
(delegation)
In this model, interests conduct a political analysis to determine their motivations 
and the nature of the politics, institutions, and officeholders involved in the issue. 
Strategy is formulated and implemented with actions focused in the institutional 
arena where policies are determined and in the administrative and regulatory 
arenas where policies are enforced. Baron considers strategies based on theories 
of political pressure, constituency connection, majority rule, vote trading, party 
leadership and collective action.34 In Baron’s model, implementing political 
strategies includes lobbying (persuasion, information provision, gaining access, 
enlisting allies) and also grassroots activities, coalition-building, testimony, 
political entrepreneurship, electoral support, communications and public 
advocacy, and judicial strategies.35 Effective lobbying strategies may rely solely 
or predominantly on a relatively limited implementation agenda. It is clear from 
the steel case, however, that the steel coalition employed virtually all of these 
26
 See, for example, Gilligan (2000); Tripathi et. al. (2002); and Milyo, et. al. (2000); 
27See, for example, Snyder (1992); and Milyo (2002).
28
 Grossman and Helpman (1994).
29
 See, for example,   Keim and Baysinger (1992); Deardorff and Stern (1998); and Lord (2000).
30
 See, for example, De Figueriedo (2002)
31
 See, for example, Heath and Nelson  (1986).
32
 See, for example, Schuler (1996); Cherington and Gillen (1962).
33




 Baron (1996): 199-202.
(action)  (action)
      Political Analysis  Strategy Formation   Implementation
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techniques in a strategic model that contains the essential elements of Baron’s 
model, but which is more complex, inter-related, and non-linear.  
A second category of study has looked at lobbying coalitions. Ever since 
Mancur Olson posed the “free rider” problem to explain why rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve group interests,36 scholars have tried 
to explain why, in fact, lobbying groups and coalitions do indeed seem to form 
and be effective. Some studies have examined the Olsonian view that 
concentrated industries tend toward greater political activity but find that other 
explanatory variables need to be considered, as well. David M. Hart suggests 
examining the allocation of attention, threat perception, and information flow 
within dominant firms.37 Other studies have considered lobbying organizations as 
political subsystems with internal characteristics of conflict and compromise 
similar to those seen in other political domains,38 or as collections of minority 
interests formed into coalitions of microstructures.39 Finally, one economic 
explanation for forming lobbying coalitions suggests that more collusive 
industries have greater incentive to form lobbying groups.40
   Many of these organizational factors are present in the case of the 1998 steel 
coalition. Consistent with Olson’s “privileged” groups, the companies involved 
ignored or accepted the presence of free riders, perhaps knowing that, as the 
dominant firms, their benefits would be proportionately greater and worth the 
investments made. The integrated steel firms, if not truly collusive, believed they 
had a shared threat and the steelworkers union commonly influenced them. While 
competitors, the companies had a history of working together on trade and other 
public policy issues and had developed the capability to mitigate internal conflict 
in the interests of collective effectiveness.
 A third area of study concerns the causes of political and lobbying activities 
by firms and industries. One profoundly simple explanation for political activity is 
that firms or industries with the most to gain41 or which see the best opportunities 
for competitive advantage42 through government action tend to be the most 
politically active. This could also be easily extended to cover those firms and 
industries that perceive the biggest threats.43 The strategic decision to enter the 
public policy arena is thus predicated on a high salience of government action to 
firm self-interest, and the availability of resources to support a lobbying effort.44
36
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The steel industry has historically sought protection from import competition 
through governmental action, and it believes that such market interventions have 
been beneficial. The largest steel companies and the USWA have committed 
resources to continuous participation in trade policy.
Firms and industry organizations, having thus determined an interested 
position in public policy and political action, must then employ strategies about 
how and whom to lobby. Some choose to lobby legislative allies, particularly in 
key committees, with the idea that their allies will, in turn, lobby other members 
on their behalf. There is evidence to indicate that groups tend to target legislators 
from areas where they have a strong presence. The SUFS coalition depended 
heavily on the members of the House and Senate Steel Caucuses and on their 
constituent Members of Congress to advocate on their behalf with other 
legislators and with the executive branch. Expanding beyond allies to reach other 
legislators is often resource dependent.45 Amy J. Hillman and Michael A. Hitt 
suggest a choice as to whether to lobby through a (short-term) transactional 
approach or a (longer term) relational approach; whether to act individually or 
collectively; and whether to select a lobbying strategy based on information, 
financial incentives, or constituency building.46 The original members of the 
SUFS Coalition took a relational approach by investing personnel and political 
resources to maintain ongoing relations with legislators and policy makers and by 
establishing a constant presence in the trade policy arena.
__________________________________________________________________
Table II
Lobbying Factors Present in Steel Case
Characteristic Present Not Present
Appeals to National Interest       X
Ideas/Appeals to Fairness and Equity       X
Economic Determinants of Political Strength       X
“Rational” Actors       X
Industry Unanimity       X
Organization/Collective Action Theory       X
Campaign Contributions       X
Constituency Building       X
Information       X
Advocacy Advertising/Communications       X
Staff Lobbyists       X
Professional Consultants       X
Transactional Lobbying       X
Relational Lobbying       X
45
 See Hojnacki and Kimball (1998); and Hojnacki and Kimball (1999).
46
 Hillman and Hitt (1999).
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Lobbying Allies       X
Lobbying Congress       X
Lobbying the Executive Branch       X
Lobbying Congress to Influence the Executive Branch     X
Legal/Administered Trade Action       X
Institutions       X
Strategic Changes Over Time       X
Past Protection       X
Source: Author’s analysis
 Douglas A. Shuler found the choice and timing of political strategies varied 
depending on the nature of the external economic pressures. Initial choices 
favored administrative relief through the filing of trade cases, followed later by 
more direct lobbying and political action when high import penetration made 
policy makers more receptive to the industry’s trade policy goals. Perhaps the 
most important role of Congressional supporters was in “pressuring the executive 
branch for long-term … solutions to imports.”47 Krueger also identifies the use of 
the administered trade processes, i.e. trade law petitions, as an “instrument to 
induce the executive branch to take action.”48 Clearly, the case depicts a strategy 
to use Congressional interests to influence White House action and to combine 
administered trade remedies with other policy options. The presence in the steel 
case of these various factors that can influence trade policy choices are depicted 
in Table II. Remarkably, they are all present.
Discussion
Steel Industry Political Effectiveness
 The U.S. domestic integrated steel industry has essentially adopted an on-
going non-market strategy to deal with the imperfections of the global steel 
marketplace. The industry has remained effective in the political domain even as 
its political footprint in the American economy shrinks. Steel sector employment 
in 1992 was less than a third of what it had been in 1974 and the industrial 
structure of the industry has changed through fragmentation, the emergence of 
minimills, increasing foreign ownership. Organized political opposition to steel 
protection has emerged.49  The case discussed above offers an explanation for 
why the steel industry has been particularly successful in influencing United 
States trade policy. The success of steel in achieving its policy objectives can be 
attributed to the commitment of financial resources, support and involvement of 
47
 Schuler (1996): 733.
48
 Krueger (1995): 427.
49
 Moore (1995): 73, 76- 77.
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senior management, management-union cooperation, and experience and 
sophistication in political strategy development and implementation. But, this 
case is significant beyond simply serving as an explanation for steels’ unique 
position in trade policy.
Political Economy of Steel Protection
 After exploring the political-economic literature on protection, Rodrik 
concluded that “Economists have always been aware that the determinants of 
trade policy are deep down political.”50 And he observes, “We do not fully 
understand the apparent political advantage of trade policy in redistributing 
income over more direct policy instruments.”51 This case demonstrates the 
political nature of trade policy and perhaps it offers at least a partial explanation 
for trade as a policy-area-of-choice for providing economic support to industries, 
communities, and workers. The political nature of trade policy is made clear by 
this case in which a supposedly pro-free trade Republican president was 
persuaded to adopt a high profile and controversial protectionist policy. Surely 
this would not have been the expected position. Yet, considerations of electoral 
politics and pressures from members of Congress acting on their own political 
interests led to an unexpected outcome.  
Why was this policy choice made over other, more economically efficient 
means of providing government support for the workers and communities affected 
by the steel import crisis? As this case demonstrates, policy arguments based on 
concepts of “fairness” and a “level playing field” can be more persuasive in 
American politics than appeals for direct “welfare-type” support. (In fact, one is 
tempted to ask if “fairness” in policymaking is a demonstration of American 
exceptionalism.) So, for instance, the politically powerful steel companies and 
unions have been remarkably successful in achieving industry-specific protection 
from “unfair” imports, but they have been remarkably unsuccessful in persuading 
the government to take over the burden of its “legacy costs” for retiree pensions 
and health care. In seeking protection, the steel industry has exhibited an 
understanding of the resonant themes in American politics. 
The case is also significant because most of the political-economic 
explanatory variables for protection-seeking firms, policy choices, and influence 
strategies are present. When considered separately, each of the political-economic 
models discussed in the literature has seemed insufficient to explain policy 
choices. The aggregation of models in this case suggests a more complete and 
integrated conceptualization of trade policy choices.
50
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A Meta-Strategic Lobbying Model
    This case suggests a meta-strategic approach that transcends the customary 
understanding of lobbying. This meta-strategic lobbying approach is conditioned 
by a complex policy environment characterized by: (1) the need to influence 
multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, executive; (2) the desire 
for multiple policy outcomes with varying levels of specificity – laws or 
resolutions, administrative rulings, international negotiations; (3) non-linear 
interactions between different levels and branches of government; (4) mutually 
supportive sub-strategies, and (5) simultaneity of these factors.
 The concept of this model is depicted in Figure 2. The meta-strategy to 
achieve multiple policy objectives is implemented through a set of inter-related, 
mutually supporting sub-strategies. For instance, communications and advocacy 
advertising support constituency building, congressional lobbying, and executive 
branch lobbying, while also framing the issue and arguing the case. Constituency-
building supports communications, campaign contributions and congressional 
lobbying. Campaign contributions support congressional lobbying. Congressional 
lobbying supports trade cases and executive branch lobbying. Executive branch 
lobbying supports trade cases and congressional lobbying. Trade cases support 
executive branch lobbying. In a complex policy environment like the trade policy 
environment in the steel case, no single sub-strategy would be sufficient to 
achieve the lobbyist’s policy objectives. Instead, an inter-related meta-strategy is 
employed to lobby multiple policy actors.
18




     Just as the discussion of trade policy choices explored the explanatory power 
of aggregation of political economy models, this meta-strategic view of lobbying 
aggregates the limited explanatory power of specific lobbying models. In 
conditions of complex policy environments a meta-strategic lobbying model 
representing a coordinated, mutually supportive aggregation of lobbying sub-
strategies is weaved into a meta-strategy that can succeed beyond the limitations 
of serial employment of more limited sub-strategies.  This model is not merely a 
strategy of “do everything and see what works.”  Rather, it is a consciously 
employed integration of sub-strategies that recognizes a complex policy 
environment and weaves together an integrated system of mutually-supportive 
inter-related strategies into an effective overall meta-strategy.  The Baron type of 
strategy model might be thus expanded to resemble something more complex.
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Political Analysis  Meta-Strategy Formation  Sub-Strategy Formulation
Institutional Arena   Administration/Regulation
(influence, delegation)
(interaction) 
Strategic Implementation Sub-Strategy Implementation
  (action)
Conclusion
 In 1998, the domestic steel industry in the United States devised and executed 
a complex and sophisticated effort to achieve an effective non-market response to 
a sudden, persistent, and damaging surge of imported steel. This campaign lasted 
until 2002, when President George W. Bush invoked Section 201 of the U.S. trade 
laws to impose tariffs on imports of most steel products. This case of the steel 
industry’s trade policy campaign examined selected models of protection-seeking 
industries and lobbying to ask why and how the steel coalition achieved this 
extraordinary governmental response.  
    A comparison with selected models of the determinants of protection-seeking 
and factors affecting lobbying strategies shows that most, almost all, were present 
in the steel case. The explanatory power of model aggregation to explain trade 
policy choices has been explored. Similarly, a conscious, coordinated, mutually 
supportive aggregation of models of lobbying sub-strategies has led to a meta-
strategic model of lobbying that transcends the customary understanding. This 
model is applicable in particularly complex policy environments, characterized by 
the need to influence multiple governmental entities – legislative, regulatory, 
executive; the desire for multiple outcomes with varying levels of specificity –
laws or resolutions, administrative rulings, policy choices; interactions between 
different levels and branches of government; mutually supportive sub-strategies 
and simultaneity of these factors.  The models discussed here seem particularly 
applicable to trade policy with its complex matrix of executive branch policy 
leadership, Congressional interest, and administrative and regulatory structures. 
  Further study is needed to determine if other complex policy environments 
produce similar meta-strategic lobbying strategies and if other industries could 
increase their effectiveness in achieving trade policy objectives by employing the 
strategies used by the steel industry. Finally, even though this study helps to 
explain how protection can be achieved through lobbying effort, more study is 
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required to answer the important political-economy question of why protection is 
the policy of choice over other means of economic support and income 
redistribution.
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